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CONSENT, AESTHETICS, AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
SEXUAL PRIVACY AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz *
INTRODUCTION
Justice Antonin Scalia raised eyebrows in a September 20, 2004
speech, stating that he could "accept for the sake of argument ... that
sexual orgies eliminate social tension and ought to be encouraged."'
After a journalist misunderstood Justice Scalia to be endorsing group
sex, the speech generated headlines.
2
What Scalia said next drew less attention, which is a shame because
Scalia was being serious and the issue he raised was interesting. Scalia
began ridiculing a European Court of Human Rights decision,3 which
had held that because of privacy rights, the state could not punish five
men who had engaged in a sex act within one of the participant's
homes. 4 Justice Scalia wondered aloud how "privacy" could possibly
cover five people, let alone some larger number, such as "the number
of people required to fill the Coliseum."
5
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. The author thanks Adam Cox, Liz
Emens, Bernard Harcourt, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments on this Article. This
Article was presented on March 13, 2004 at the DePaul University College of Law Symposium:
Privacy and Identity: Constructing, Maintaining, and Protecting Personhood.
1. Some Non-Judicious Comments - for a Supreme Court Justice, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2004,
2004 WL 83669865.
2. The Harvard Crimson misquoted Scalia as having said, "I even take the position that sexual
orgies eliminate social tension and ought to be encouraged." Al Kamen, Voice of Doubt Won't
Go Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2004, at A21.
3. See A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 803 (2000) (invalidating the prosecution
of an individual, who engaged in consensual sex with four other men in his home, after police
obtained a videotape of the group sex act from the defendant's home).
4. Some Non-Judicious Comments, supra note 1.
5. Id. Justice Scalia seems particularly interested in sex acts in stadiums. He invoked the
same hypothetical in his concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991), a
1991 nude dancing case:
The purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully con-
senting adults crowded into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one another,
even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd. Our society prohibits, and all
human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but
because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, "contra bonos mores," i.e., im-
moral ....
ld. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia's comments effectively used the ambiguity over pri-
vacy's meaning to nudge his audience down a slippery slope, toward a
seemingly absurd result. Indeed, Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas
was premised on the parade of horribles that a society unable to regu-
late morality for its own sake would confront.6
The question of sex involving multiple participants is by no means
purely academic. States have prosecuted this behavior in the past, and
one can expect that some prosecutors will test Lawrence by trying to
do so in the future.7 Indeed, Lawrence and Justice Scalia's widely
publicized comments provide an opportunity to revisit the leading
American group sex case, the Fourth Circuit's 1976 opinion in Lovisi
v. Slayton.8
The facts of Lovisi are as follows: The Lovisis were a married
couple who found themselves in jail after violating Virginia's law
criminalizing sodomy. 9 Aldo and Margaret Lovisi had invited Earl
Dunn into their home to join them in a m6nage A trois.10 Margaret
performed oral sex on both men." They also used a Polaroid camera
to take pictures of the sex act, and one of Margaret's daughters later
found another sexually explicit photograph at home and took it to
school. 12 The authorities were informed, and the police obtained a
warrant to search the house, where they found hundreds of Polaroid
snapshots that the defendants had taken.' 3 These snapshots provided
the basis for the state's prosecution of the Lovisis. 14
The Lovisi court, writing after Roe v. Wade 15 but before Bowers v.
Hardwick,16 assumed that the couple had a privacy right to engage in
consensual sex in their bedrooms.' 7 As the court put it, "What they
do in the privacy of the marital boudoir is beyond the power of the
state to scrutinize.' 8 But the court proceeded to hold that after Mr.
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Justin Bergman, Va. Anti-Sodomy Code Challenged; Convict's Case Cites High
Court Ruling Abolishing Texas Law, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 14, 2004, 2004 WL
61910037.
8. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
9. Id. at 350.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 350-51; Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 622-23 (E.D. Va. 1973).
13. Lovisi, 539 F.2d at 351.
14. Id. at 350.
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. Lovisi, 539 F.2d at 351.
18. Id. at 351.
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Dunn entered the room, the Lovisis lost any constitutional right to
privacy. 19 In the court's words,
Once a married couple admits strangers as onlookers, federal pro-
tection of privacy dissolves. It matters not whether the audience is
composed of one, fifty, or one hundred, or whether the onlookers
pay for their titillation .... [T]hey cannot selectively claim that the
state is an intruder .... Nor should [the case] turn upon the fact
that the onlookers, however many, are not only passive observers
but are participants themselves in sexual activity, some of it with
one or more of the partners to the marriage. In either such event,
the married couple has welcomed a stranger to the marital bed-
chamber, and what they do is no longer in the privacy of their
marriage.20
Thus, according to the Lovisi court, sexual privacy disappears as soon
as a third person is exposed to the sex act.
Even though it cited the Griswold v. Connecticut2' line of cases,
which is commonly understood as decisional privacy authority,
Lovisi's conception of sexual privacy seems to invoke information pri-
vacy concepts. After all, the result seems inconsistent with decisional
privacy analysis: If one sets tradition and existing norms aside, it is
difficult to explain why the decision to have sex with one's spouse
deserves more protection than the decision to have sex with one's
spouse and another person at the same time. The result also seems
inconsistent with notions of associational privacy and the privacy-as-
dignity thread that appears occasionally in Lawrence.22 The Lovisis
and Dunn were involved in an intimate association. For all we know,
they were as likely to engage in a persistent relationship as Lawrence
and Garner were. And punishing the Lovisis for this action seems to
offend a dignity-based notion of privacy. So we can read Lovisi as




21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 575 (2003).
23. A similar vision emerges from Kraus v. Village of Barrington Hills, 571 F. Supp. 538 (N.D.
Ill. 1982). That case involved a "swinger's club" consisting of 250 couples who met in private
homes for consensual partner-swapping (although presumably not all the members got together
at once). Id. at 548. The court noted that the club "conducts its meetings and activities entirely
within the residence of plaintiff. We do not believe that sexual activities behind closed doors
jeopardize the public peace; nor does it appear at this stage of the proceeding that the activity is
'open' within the meaning of criminal statutes" barring public indecency. Id. at 541-42. The
court then dropped a fascinating footnote immediately following this text:
It might be argued that the activity which occurs at plaintiff's home is "open and notori-
ous" as far as members of the group are concerned .... The requirement that the
conduct be "open and notorious" was designed to put "private" conduct beyond the
reach of the criminal law. It is not clear from the complaint whether the sexual activi-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
By bringing the information privacy style analysis into a constitu-
tional, sexual privacy dispute, Lovisi provided a novel, interesting, and
in some respects, appealing take on sexual privacy. Of course, Bowers
rendered Lovisi's analysis a dead end by reaffirming the legitimacy of
legislation based solely on morality.24 If the state could prevent two
men from having sex with each other, regardless of any privacy inter-
est, then the state could prevent two men from having sex with a
woman. Now that Lawrence has overruled Bowers, it is time to con-
template the Lovisi approach and figure out how far Lawrence's "pri-
vacy" principle ought to go. To begin that inquiry, we should turn to
Lawrence's text.
There are two critical passages in Lawrence, both of which appear
in the last few paragraphs of the majority opinion. The first paragraph
of note provides the Court's philosophical basis for rejecting the ratio-
nale of Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy
law. 25
The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis. In his
dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens came to these
conclusions:
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly
clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice. ... Second, individual decisions by married per-
sons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relation-
ship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a
form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection
extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as mar-
ried persons."
ties engaged in by members of [the club] are in the open view of other members or not.
The complaint is silent on the point. The matter could be a function of how many
members attend a meeting, the number in attendance who engage in sexual activities,
and the number of rooms available for the activity.
Id. at 542 n.3.
24. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
25. In Bowers, the Court stated:
[RIespondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is
none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an
inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on no-
tions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invali-
dated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. [Respondent]
insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared
inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25
States should be invalidated on this basis.
[Vol. 54:671
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Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling
in Bowers and should control here. 26
In this passage, the Court rejected the idea that the state has the au-
thority to enforce legislation that is spurred exclusively by the moral
views of the majority of its citizens. Something else, namely a harm to
some third party, is required for the state to engage in this form of
morality legislation, where such legislation imposes harms on an indi-
vidual's protected liberty interests. In so doing, the Court evidently
embraced the "harm principle. 2
7
The second critical passage in Lawrence appears shortly thereafter,
largely as an attempt to limit the scope of the paragraph excerpted
above. 28 It suggests that substantial restrictions on sexual conduct are
consistent with the harm principle.
29
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve per-
sons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged
in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petition-
ers are entitled to respect for their private lives .... The Texas stat-
ute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.
30
26. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1089 (2004); James E. Fleming,
Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563, 574 (2004); Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v. Texas
and the Limits of the Criminal Law 6 n.15 (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=616942. See also Steven D. Smith, The Hollowness of the Harm Principle 4 (Univ. of San
Diego Law School, Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-07, Sept. 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=591327 (noting that "some commentators have argued that the re-
cent case of Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law prohibiting
homosexual sodomy, effectively constitutionalized the harm principle." (footnotes omitted)).
But see Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevi-
table Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1315-32 (2004) (arguing that
Lawrence's embrace of the harm principle is merely rhetorical). For an extended discussion of
the harm principle, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). Harcourt argues that courts and commentators increasingly
adopted the harm principle during the twentieth century but simultaneously expanded the uni-
verse of "harms" that could form the predicate for state restrictions on individual liberty. Id. at
113-15. For further discussion of the harm principle, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS
(1984).
28. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
29. See id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
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This part of the opinion seems designed to respond to the parade of
horribles Justice Scalia evoked in his Lawrence dissent.3' Yet it is try-
ing to do more than that. The majority recognized, as any first-year
law student would, that its intonation that "this case does not involve
public conduct or prostitution" was an inadequate reply to Justice
Scalia's suggestion that the implications of the majority's holding seem
to open the door for an invalidation of laws against public sex and
prostitution.32 Justice Kennedy tried to write a landmark opinion in
Lawrence that would stand the test of time, and one cannot help read-
ing his second excerpted paragraph as an attempt to highlight limiting
principles, not mere limitations on the holding.
Much of what Justice Kennedy articulated related to privacy inter-
ests, and references to privacy were pervasive in the majority opin-
ion.33 Why invoke privacy so often? His distinction between private
and public conduct would be irrelevant if Lawrence was simply a case
about individual liberty. When we read the two paragraphs together,
we begin to suspect that the harm principle only applies to private
acts. If an act occurs in public, then it can impose harms on those who
see it, and these harms form the predicate for state intervention. If it
occurs in private, then the only harms that might arise involve harms
to the participants (which, the Court implies, do not count) and re-
lated negative externalities (which, I argue, probably do not count ei-
ther). Privacy's important role in Lawrence actually cements an
understanding of Justice Kennedy's opinion as an embrace of the
harm principle.
In the pages that follow, I examine the interplay between these two
juxtaposed paragraphs and say more about how they can be recon-
ciled. My effort will be to read Lawrence faithfully and see whether
coherent principles underlie its notions of privacy, consent, and moral-
31. Justice Scalia suggested that "[sltate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustaina-
ble only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these
laws is called into question by today's decision." Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See generally id.
33. Randy Barnett has suggested that Lawrence is not an opinion about privacy. His widely
read paper emphasized that while the majority opinion in Lawrence made just a single reference
to a "right of privacy," the majority opinion used the word "liberty" at least twenty-five times.
Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas 13 (Boston Univ.
School of Law, Working Paper No. 03-13, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=422564. Barnett's methodology turns out to be rather misleading. While "right of privacy"
appears only twice in the Supreme Court's opinion, the words "private" or "privacy" make a
grand total of twenty-eight appearances, edging out "liberty" by a nose. Among the alternative
concepts that might have driven Lawrence's analysis, "privacy" appears the most, followed by
"liberty" (twenty-five mentions), "consent" (twenty-two mentions), "intimacy" (eleven men-
tions), and then the also-rans: "dignity" (three mentions) and "equality" (one mention).
[Vol. 54:671
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ity. This inquiry will in turn shed light on several issues left open by
Lawrence regarding the scope of the constitutional right recognized
therein. Does Lawrence protect the rights of more than two individu-
als to engage in sex acts in each other's presence? Does it offer pro-
tection to sex acts that occur outside the home? Is it even possible to
draw a line between private and public sex?
I argue that under Lawrence's harm principle, the state retains au-
thority to regulate aesthetics but loses any authority to regulate mo-
rality. The essential difference between aesthetics and morality is that
the unwitting bystander can perceive, with his own senses, offenses to
aesthetic interests but not offenses to moral interests. Although I am
ambivalent about the normative appeal of the harm principle as a
foundational rule in constitutional law, I conclude that Lawrence's ap-
parent embrace of both the principle and a public-private dichotomy
lends itself to workable legal rules.
This symposium contribution proceeds as follows. Part II examines
the legal relationship between consent and privacy. It suggests that in
both the information privacy and decisional privacy lines of authority,
privacy rarely means solitude but reflects limited sharing of informa-
tion with people who consent to be exposed to it. Part III explores the
boundary between "public" sex and "private" sex, only the latter of
which Lawrence purports to protect. It argues that a binary concep-
tion of "public versus private" oversimplifies the social and spatial as-
pects of privacy. This Part attempts to sketch out a more sophisticated
understanding of "relatively public" sex, grounded in information pri-
vacy law. Part IV discusses the problems created by relatively public
sex and the rationales for limiting it. Part V asks "what might be said
on behalf of public sex?" and concludes that the case for limiting such
conduct is strong in places to which everyone has access but weak in
places to which the general public's access can be restricted. Part VI
revisits Lovisi v. Slayton.
II. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND CONSENT
Privacy law encompasses many different types of legal protections.
Most relevant for the purposes of this Article, however, are "informa-
tion privacy" (an individual's ability to control what others know
about him) 34 and "decisional privacy" (an individual's right to make
34. Information privacy implicates the tort for public disclosure of private facts; the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments; the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 104 Pub. Law No. 191,
110 Stat. 1936; The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000); Whalen v. Roe's, 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
right to privacy; and most of what we think of as "privacy law" in the United States.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671
decisions about his private affairs without undue state interference). 35
In this Article, I focus on those decisional privacy rights that protect
sexual privacy.
Consent reflects voluntariness in both the information and deci-
sional contexts. In the case of information, consent means that the
subject of the information (i.e., the person to whom the information
relates) agrees to its dissemination. If the subject has consented, then
someone who disseminates that information cannot be liable in tort.
In the case of sex, consent means that all participants in the sex act
must freely agree to participate. For both varieties of consent, the law
holds that certain people, such as minors or the mentally ill, are often
presumed incapable of consenting. Moreover, in both the decisional
and information privacy context, the law will focus on the consent of
someone other than the person whose conduct is the subject of at-
tempted regulation.36
35. Decisional privacy manifests itself most prominently in opinions like Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992); and now confines itself largely to substantive due process claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Privacy scholars also refer to "associational privacy" as well as "privacy as dignity." See, e.g.,
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1394; Robert C. Post,
Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092-95 (2001). Associational privacy includes,
on the narrow reading, little more than a political association's First Amendment rights to main-
tain secret membership rolls. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (invalidating
a state ordinance that required the NAACP to disclose the identities of its members and contrib-
utors); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that under the First
Amendment freedom of association, the NAACP need not disclose its membership lists to the
state). Broader conceptions of associational privacy have been advanced most eloquently by
Kenneth Karst. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624 (1980) (arguing that associational privacy also encompasses the right to choose one's
friends and lovers without the interference of neighbors or the state). The comparativist Jim
Whitman reminds us that there is a very different, European conception of privacy, which pro-
tects against affronts to human dignity and which casts the press, not the government, in the role
of villain. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
One of the interesting things about Lawrence is that we can plausibly ground it in any of these
four conceptions of privacy. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental
Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896-97 (2004). Perhaps Law-
rence is about keeping Texas police officers from coming into a bedroom and arresting him on
the basis of what they see. See id. at 1897. Perhaps Lawrence is about permitting gay couples to
make decisions about how to live their lives without the state's interference. See id. at 1896.
Perhaps Lawrence is about respecting intimacy established within homosexual relationships. See
id. Or perhaps Lawrence is about protecting the dignity of homosexuals and rejecting Texas's
efforts to make second-class citizens out of them because anti-sodomy laws stigmatized and trig-
gered further discrimination against gays and lesbians. See id.
36. DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 100 (2000). In other words, when A is sued in tort, it is
the consent of B, the subject of the private information that A disseminated, that may prove
decisive. Similarly, if A is accused of violating a state sodomy law, then he can only claim consti-
tutional protection if B, his partner, consented to the sex act in question, and vice versa.
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In privacy tort law, there are close connections between privacy and
consent. The law does not treat any fact about a person as inherently
private. If I chose to publish my social security number in this Article,
then I would have no public disclosure of private facts suit against
someone who published it elsewhere. 37 Thus, an individual can trans-
form previously private information into public information through
express consent to such a transformation, and this consent need not be
explicit in all cases. 38 Similarly, privacy rights can be protected by
contract.39 If A secures private information about B after promising B
confidentiality and then disseminates that information to a wider audi-
ence, then B can sue A, either on a contract theory (for breach of
confidentiality) or a tort theory (for violating B's reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy).
It is worth pausing to consider why the law of information privacy
should defer so much to individual consent. After all, people some-
times regret earlier decisions to share private information with third
parties. 40 Individuals' decisions to share details of their personal lives
also might create negative externalities by, for example, coarsening
public discourse, causing others to become too cautious in sharing
their own personal information, or demystifying aspects of human life
that ought to remain under wraps.41 Despite this, the law rarely limits
the individual's ability to share private information about one's self
with others. Only when children are involved, or obscene personal
information that is likely to offend or harass listeners is implicated,
does the law prohibit these kinds of dissemination.42
37. I might still have a claim against the person who misused my social security number, for
example, to commit identity theft. But such a claim would have to rely on some other substan-
tive provisions of tort law.
38. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 199-200 (1988).
39. Id. at 222-26.
40. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (adjudicating a claim by a surfer
who provided a Sports Illustrated reporter with extensive information about his personal life, and
then changed his mind and sought to prevent the story's publication); Mark Schwed, Girls Gone
Wild to Shoot at Jupiter Club, PALM BEACH POST, at http://palmbeachpost.comllocal-newslcon
tent/epaper/2005103/12/ClC-wild_0312.html (discussing a lawsuit filed by a college student
against the producers of Girls Gone Wild videos after she regretted her earlier decision to dis-
robe on Bourbon Street during Mardi Gras).
41. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy 5-6 (Univ. of Chicago
John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, 2d Series No. 230, Dec. 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=629283 (forthcoming 72 U. CHI. L. REv. (Aug. 2005)). See also
CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY 42 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding
that an employee's statements to a co-worker about their own sexual experiences and her role in
a co-worker's sexually explicit dreams could create a hostile work environment under Title VII);
John D. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 744 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a
stepfather's repeated nudity in the presence of his teenage daughter, combined with other sexual
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Society's general reluctance to punish the dissemination of private
information is perhaps explained by First Amendment concerns or an
understanding that people usually will act to protect their private in-
formation unless they have strong reasons for failing to do so. The
First Amendment implications of a law that barred individuals from
discussing their private thoughts or experiences are obvious enough.
The anti-paternalism argument is more complicated and warrants at-
tention. Surely there are instances where limiting people's ability to
disclose information about themselves would enhance social welfare. 43
And we have little reason to expect that individuals will appreciate or
respond to the social costs associated with their disclosure of private
information about themselves. That said, we ought to worry about the
capacity of government to identify those situations in which the social
costs of information suppression exceed the social costs of dissemina-
tion with much accuracy or cost-effectiveness. Indeed, the social cost
calculations are probably so complicated that the law properly deems
private costs the only relevant consideration and defers to the individ-
ual, who is usually in the best position to analyze the private costs and
benefits of dissemination and has the right incentives to maximize pri-
vate welfare. In the tort context, the law therefore typically concludes
that the costs associated with having the government second-guess in-
dividual decisions about what personal information to disclose exceed
the benefits from doing so. 44 It is only where the parties to a commu-
nication disagree about whether the communication is desirable (e.g.,
a hostile work environment claim by an employee), or where one
party to a communication is not in a position to consent fully (e.g., a
child exposed to sexually explicit information), that the state
intervenes. 45
Consent plays a similar role in decisional privacy cases. As with
information privacy, there might be negative externalities associated
with allowing people to make decisions for themselves. Some people
will regret their decisions after the fact, and their decisions to have
abortions, engage in consensual sodomy, or educate their children in a
certain way might have adverse effects on third parties. In instances
involving decisional privacy, unlike information privacy, legislators
communications, constituted child abuse, notwithstanding the lack of physical contact between
the daughter and stepfather).
43. For example, barring individuals from disclosing their credit card numbers or other finan-
cial payment information to strangers who call them at home might well prove welfare-maximiz-
ing, because it would shut off a popular avenue for fraud and might prevent more unwanted
telemarketing calls than a Do-Not-Call registry.
44. See Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 10 n.23.
45. Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1170; John D., 744 N.E.2d at 664.
[Vol. 54:671
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have demonstrated an activist streak, choosing to enact laws that pro-
hibit abortion, sodomy, and the teaching of German in schools. 46 Yet,
again, there are two kinds of arguments for state noninterference with
decisions made by consenting adults. There is a constitutional argu-
ment-this time invoking the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-and a more pragmatic one, suggesting that the govern-
ment will be unable to distinguish accurately between an individual's
decisions likely to be regretted or harmful to third parties, and those
that are not. The harm principle seems to be, in part, an effort to
channel the pragmatic argument into the constitutional argument.
Note, however, that in this decisional privacy context, consent is not
always decisive. Consent certainly functions to distinguish between
those exercises of individual liberty that can be proscribed unques-
tionably and those that the state might or might not be able to pro-
hibit. Thus, there is plainly no right to commit rape or to force an
unwilling physician to assist in euthanasia. 47 However, the Court so
far has been unwilling to embrace the proposition that if everyone
who is directly affected by an activity consents to it, it is protected by a
fundamental right; hence the Court's rejection of the right to consen-
sual euthanasia in Washington v. Glucksberg.
48
III. THE BORDER BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SEX
Now that we have spent a little bit of time thinking about consent, it
makes sense to devote some thought to the meaning of privacy. The
Supreme Court in Lawrence emphasized that the right it was protect-
46. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (involving a legislative ban on sodomy);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a ban on abortion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (invalidating a law that barred public and private schools from teaching any language
other than English to students who had not passed the eighth grade).
What are we to make of legislatures' general deference to individuals' decisions about sharing
information, but their comparable lack of deference to individuals' decisions about procreation
or sex partners? One explanation might be that third parties are more offended by deeds than
they are by words. But even if that is true, there is something peculiar afoot. Abortions and
consensual sodomy are typically carried out within closed spaces, far from public view. Few
people, other than the participants, generally witness acts of sodomy or abortions. The commu-
nication of previously private information, by contrast, sometimes occurs in highly visible ways-
via the mass media. Leaving constitutional considerations aside, it would be surprising that a
legislature would want to ban a couple from engaging in sodomy behind closed doors but permit
an individual to tell 500 people that he is a homosexual.
47. Sometimes, however, the courts are willing to recognize fundamental rights to engage in
activity that harms nonconsenting third parties. For example, courts have generally struck down
requirements that a pregnant woman obtain the consent of the fetus's father in order to obtain
an abortion. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal Bonding
in the Law of Family Relations, 33 IND. L. REV. 691, 717-25 (2000) (discussing the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence with respect to a prospective father's right to prevent an abortion).
48. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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ing consisted of a right for two people to engage in "private," "consen-
sual" conduct. 49 Framing the right in this way raises a number of
interesting questions about the meaning of privacy. To begin this in-
quiry, it will be helpful to conceptualize privacy as arising in two re-
lated dimensions: social and spatial. Intuitively, when trying to gauge
whether an activity was "private," we will want to know where it took
place and who was there.
Consider social privacy first. Under a quite narrow understanding
of information privacy, information ceases to be private as soon as it is
shared with a third party. 50 But conceptualizing Lawrence as an infor-
mation privacy case helps reveal the problems with this logic. If sex-
ual privacy is really about information privacy, then is it not the
presence of a second person in the room that is problematic? After
all, there are numerous cases of betrayal involving kissing and telling,
surreptitious videotaping and subsequent dissemination, and the like,
where just two people took part in a sex act. 5' Surely the realm of
protected sexual activity cannot be limited to Stanley v. Georgia situa-
tions, where a solitary person alone in his home uses pornographic
films for sexual gratification. 52 As soon as we get to Griswold, or Roe,
or Lawrence, there is necessarily a "stranger" in the room, and one
runs the risk that one's sexual conduct will be exposed. On this con-
ception of sexual privacy, we need to address the fundamental ques-
tion of why Tyron Garner's presence in the room with John Geddes
49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
50. See Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 22-25 (discussing cases that adopt this "hard-line" con-
ception of privacy).
51. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). The Bill
Clinton-Monica Lewinsky affair is perhaps the most momentous "kiss and tell" incident in
American history. See, e.g., James Bennet, Testing of a President: The Overview; Clinton Admits
Lewinsky Liaison to Jury; Tells Nation "It Was Wrong," But Private, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998,
at Al.
52. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Katherine Franke has criticized the majority's opinion on the grounds that it demeans homo-
sexual sex by demanding that it be hidden from public view. See generally Katherine M. Franke,
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004). Franke states:
To a troubling degree ... the privatized liberty of Lawrence leaves lower courts free
to cabin protection of, and thus interpret, non-normative sexualities in ways similar to
Stanley v. Georgia, in which the Court tolerated obscenity at the price of demeaning it,
characterizing it as "a base thing that should nonetheless be tolerated so long as it takes
place in private." The work done by the public/private distinction ... may portend a
Stanley-like treatment of privacy and privatized liberty rights for nonnormative sexuali-
ties: Unless they are expressed in respectable private contexts, they may not seek ref-
uge in the Constitution.
Id. at 1407 (footnote omitted) (quoting Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Tolera-
tion: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL L. REV. 521, 537 (1989)).
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Lawrence does not transform Lawrence's sexual activities into the
kind of "public sex" that seems to worry Justice Scalia so much.
53
Information privacy law actually has a relatively good answer to this
question. Under the approach now followed in a plurality of states,
disclosing information to a network of friends, relatives, and even
some strangers, does not necessarily waive a plaintiff's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy for the purposes of tort law. 54 For example, a
court has permitted a plaintiff to sue for tortious disclosure of his HIV
positive status to television viewers even though that same plaintiff
had willingly disclosed his status to sixty friends, relatives, co-workers,
and participants in an HIV support group.55 You can tell sixty people
a fact about yourself, and still have it be "private" for the purposes of
privacy tort law.56
Now consider the spatial dimensions of privacy. It is perhaps
tempting to juxtapose a geographic zone of privacy against a public
sphere. But a binary conception of spatial privacy is not workable.
There are many semi-private spaces: A health club's locker room, a
car parked in a residential driveway, or a recovery room at a hospital
containing multiple beds. Here too, courts have been willing to pro-
tect privacy within controlled environments: One can expect privacy
against outsiders, while not expecting privacy with respect to insid-
ers.57 When nonlawyers write about sexuality in public, they often
struggle with the ambiguity surrounding what it means for a place to
be public or private.58 For example, Laud Humphreys, author of the
leading case study on public sex, excludes locales such as gay bars or
53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 18-22.
55. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). See also
M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623 (2001) (holding that a little league baseball
photo is private despite circulation within community); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1427 (1988) (holding that a murder witness's identity is private despite disclo-
sure to friends, neighbors, family, and police); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C.
1985) (holding that limited disclosure of plastic surgery to family and friends does not render the
information public); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that in
vitro fertilization is private despite disclosure to fellow participants and medical personnel).
56. See Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 21-22.
57. See, e.g., Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Serv., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that fe-
male models who undressed in each other's presence had a cause of action against "peeping
Tom" security guards who used a security camera to leer at the models in various states of
undress); Benitez v. KFC Nat'l Mgm't Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that
male employees who spied on multiple undressing female employees intruded upon their seclu-
sion even though the undressed co-workers disrobed in each other's presence); Huskey v. NBC,
632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that a prisoner who worked out in a prison's exercise
cage had a reasonable expectation of privacy against being filmed for a television broadcast even
though other inmates and prison guards could see him exercising).
58. Pat Califia's writing seizes on the ambiguity:
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bath houses from his conception of "public," noting that nayve pass-
ersby are routinely warned at the entrance about what they will see if
they continue into the establishment. 59 Such nuances underscore the
connection between social privacy and spatial privacy. Both variables
measure the extent to which information is nonsecret. Social privacy
looks to the number of participants, and spatial privacy addresses the
size and character of the potential audience.
To reflect these gradations of privacy, privacy law should borrow
from property law, which delineates property regimes into private
property, limited commons, and open access regimes. 60 Private prop-
erty can give the owner nearly absolute rights to exclude outsiders. 61
Open access resources, like a public beach or urban streets, are open
to whomever wishes to use them, provided users do not engage in
conduct that violates the "rules of the road." Limited commons re-
gimes lie somewhere in between: A collective permits its members to
use a resource freely but excludes outsiders from the property. Exam-
ples of limited commons spaces include condominium lobbies, country
club dining facilities, and many university libraries. Indeed, there are
hybrids even within these categories. University libraries typically
grant some students the equivalent of leasehold rights to particular
Most people who condemn public sex do not seem to know that the legal difference
between public and private sex is not a simple matter of choosing either the bushes or
your bedroom. There are many zones in between-a motel room, a bathhouse, a bar.
an adult bookstore, a car, a public toilet, a dark and deserted alley-that are contested
territory where police battle with perverts for control.
There is almost always some kind of physical barrier-some bushes, a bathroom door,
or a car-between the participants in public sex and the outside world. This barrier
screens out the uninitiated. If more than two people are present, one of them usually
acts as a lookout. Thus, this behavior is more properly called "quasi-public sex."
People sitting behind the closed door of a bathroom or of a movie booth in an adult
bookstore can reasonably assume they have privacy. You could make the same as-
sumption if you were sitting in your car in a deserted location late at night. All of these
are favored locations for so-called public sex. If people are going to see what is going
on in these places, they must intrude.
PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX 74-76 (1994). See also William L.
Leap, Introduction to PUBLIC SEX: GAY SPACE 9 (William L. Leap ed., 1999). Leap states that
"[in general usage, public vs. private does not refer to properties inherent in any locale, so much
as it specifies two different interpretations . . .of the visibility or accessibility of a particular
locale; that is, public identifies a location which appears to be 'open,' accessible." Id.
59. LAUD HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC PLACES 160 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
553 (2001); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emis-
sion Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 154-62 (1998); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEOAL STUD. 453,
457-58 (2002).
61. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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carrels (private property), leave some tables open for students on a
first-come, first-serve basis (limited commons), and permit the public
to access government documents stored on the premises (open
access).
As one moves from private property to limited commons to open
access ownership regimes, an individual owner's ability to exclude
outsiders diminishes. In the case of private property, the owner ordi-
narily can exclude everyone but civil servants performing emergency
public functions, such as firemen fighting a blaze or police officers ex-
ercising a valid search warrant. 62 In a limited commons, the owners
can exclude nonmembers but not members. In the open access case,
the individual has no right to exclude anyone from entering the rele-
vant space.
As these exclusion rights diminish, society's interest in regulating
sexual conduct increases. Hence, the harm principle provides little
justification for restricting sex inside a private home with the window
shades drawn, a stronger justification for restricting sex in a health
club sauna, and a very strong justification for restricting it on a side-
walk adjoining San Francisco's Haight Street in broad daylight.63
These implications about social and spatial privacy reinforce common
ideas about allowing third-party bystanders to avoid unwanted expo-
sure to other people's sexual conduct.
IV. THE CASE FOR REGULATING PUBLIC SEX
Under the harm principle, the difference between protected rela-
tively "private" sex and relatively "public" sex, which can be pro-
scribed, must be that the former generates fewer negative externalities
than the latter. Indeed, as understood by Lawrence, negative exter-
nalities that result from perceiving an offensive activity count, but
those associated with merely knowing that an offensive activity is tak-
ing place somewhere do not count.64 The legislature can only act with
62. The leading case that analyzes the limitations on the private property owners' right to
exclude outsiders is State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). There is also a necessity defense to
trespass. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1465 (1996).
63. While giving my parents and sister a tour of my neighborhood during the summer of 1998,
I saw a graphic sex act occur on a street crowded with pedestrians.
64. Feinberg explains:
There is one kind of offended state that can probably never satisfy [the harm principle],
namely the shock or disappointment occasioned by the bare knowledge that other per-
sons are doing, or may be doing, immoral things in private with legal impunity. It is
conceivable, I suppose, that there could be a person whose moral sensibilities are so
tender that such knowledge would lead to a mental breakdown; but in such a case, it
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the intent of curtailing harms that third parties perceive with their
senses.
Unfortunately, upon reflection, matters turn out to be more compli-
cated than this dichotomy suggests. Some forms of "bare knowledge"
are more immediate than others, and, therefore, likely engender more
substantial negative externalities. Suppose that Joe, a Baltimore resi-
dent, is offended by the idea of gay sex. Under ordinary circum-
stances, we can expect that Joe will experience great embarrassment,
shame, or anger if he sees two men engaging in sex in a public park.
Joe's reactions will be more muted if he knows that, statistically
speaking, two gay men are likely engaged in sex somewhere in Man-
hattan right now.65 The Lawrence Court, defensibly, views the first
set of reactions, but not the second, as a predicate for state action.
But what about intermediate levels of sensory perception? Suppose
Joe sees his next-door neighbor and a stranger walk into the neigh-
bor's home. Just before the door closes, Joe hears the neighbor ask
the stranger "wanna have sex?" and the stranger's affirmative re-
sponse. Joe then sees the stranger leave his neighbor's home the fol-
lowing morning. Whatever one thinks of the legitimacy of Joe's
reactions to witnessing these scenes, 66 it seems safe to predict that he
will experience greater disutility from this scenario than he will from
his bare knowledge about sodomy between two strangers somewhere
in Manhattan. If Joe's feelings are sufficiently intense, and the neigh-
bor's encounter with the stranger was not particularly meaningful or
enjoyable, it is conceivable that Joe's disutility will exceed the positive
utility gained by the neighbor and the stranger.67 Is Joe's intermediate
disutility sufficient to form a predicate for state action?
would be more plausible to attribute the breakdown to abnormal susceptibilities than
to the precipitating cause.
FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 50. Feinberg provides a lengthy treatment of this subject and the
"bare knowledge" problem. See id. at 58-71.
65. It may be inaccurate to say that Joe is not harmed by such conduct. See Smith, supra note
27, at 27-29 (arguing that people may suffer disutility upon acquiring abstract knowledge of such
events, even if they do not know any of the details).
66. I am not sympathetic to Joe's sentiments, but I do not doubt the sincerity of people who
hold views similar to Joe's.
67. This example raises the problem of interpersonal utility comparison, which presents a re-
curring problem for utilitarians. For a recent exploration of the subject, see Daniel M. Hausman,
The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995). One might address
this problem, albeit clumsily, by focusing on the parties' relative willingness to pay. Thus, if Joe,
the neighbor, and the stranger all have roughly equal disposable incomes and wealth, then Joe's
willingness to pay $1,000 to prevent the neighbor and the stranger from engaging in sexual rela-
tions, combined with the neighbor and stranger's unwillingness to spend more than $250 to
spend the night together, might help convince us that restricting the conduct in question would
increase society's utility (ignoring any additional externalities).
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The Supreme Court would almost certainly say no. The inadequacy
of bare knowledge is strongly suggested by the text of Lawrence,
which states that the "fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. '68 It seems un-
controversial to assert that when many people view a practice as im-
moral, they will sincerely say they suffer disutility from the
continuation of that practice, and they may attempt to restrict the
practice as a way of increasing their own utility. 69 The Lawrence ma-
jority probably would concede this point. But the quoted text sug-
gests that these forms of disutility do not "count" as harms.
70
But what about Joe's more substantial disutility from seeing the ac-
tions that preceded his neighbor's likely sex act? It is not obvious
from the text that this "disutility" also fails to count as a "harm" that
will authorize state intervention. Notably, however, the facts of Law-
rence suggest that in the view of the majority, intermediate disutility,
based on some level of immediate knowledge, will not satisfy the
harm principle either. After all, we know that Lawrence's neighbor
had a strong reason to suspect that Lawrence was engaged in homo-
sexual sodomy, and called the police, falsely telling them that he sus-
pected a "weapons disturbance. '71 Looking for a weapon, the police
entered the home and found Lawrence and Garner engaging in sod-
omy.72 When the Court says that there is no legitimate interest in
preventing private sodomy, 73 it implicitly holds that to be true even in
cases where nosy neighbors have a strong basis for believing that sod-
omy is occurring, and feel sufficiently angered by this conduct to call
the police under false pretenses.
Returning to our hypothetical neighbor, Joe, legal doctrine might
provide the Court with an easier way out. As a doctrinal matter, the
Court probably would note the legality of walking to the threshold of
a private home, the constitutionally protected nature of the query
"wanna have sex?" said by one consenting adult to another, and the
legality of spending the night somewhere within another person's pri-
vate residence. An ordinary person would not be offended by the first
or third step,74 and while the law admits that people may be offended
68. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted)).
69. See Smith, supra note 27, at 24-31.
70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
71. Id. at 562.
72. Id. at 563.
73. Id. at 578.
74. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 27.
688 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671
by the conversation between the neighbor and the stranger, the First
Amendment holds that the right to speak freely in public trumps these
offenses to an audience. 75 Admittedly, however, this disaggregation
will not be satisfying on welfarist grounds. But then, Lawrence's harm
principle is not genuinely welfarist. 76 Rather, it is a recognition of the
difficulties that arise when translating an abstract harm principle into
legal doctrine, given First Amendment and other nonwelfarist
commitments.
The question of whether a third party has perceived, with his own
senses, the offensive conduct that the state seeks to regulate, offers
judges the prospect of a relatively bright line rule.77 The line-drawing
issues surrounding differing levels of immediacy that fall short of sen-
sory perception seem much less conducive to legal resolution. Judicial
administrability thus justifies treating "bare knowledge" and "inter-
mediate knowledge" differently from "actual knowledge acquired via
sensory perception."
Limiting ourselves to the universe of sensory perception, we can
imagine three types of "valid" negative externalities that relatively
public sex might engender. First, relatively public sex might be wit-
nessed by an adult who would prefer not to see the act in question or a
child who cannot consent effectively. Second, relatively public sex
might engender greater "secondary effects" than relatively private
75. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
76. A genuinely welfarist approach would count all disutility incurred as a result of any action
and compare that disutility to the positive utility resulting from the action. But Mill, Feinberg,
and other harm principle proponents have argued that certain types of disutility suffered by
individuals do not count as harms. See Smith, supra note 27, at 32-39. For this reason, to its
critics, the harm principle is an empty vessel, whether it arises in legal doctrine or philosophical
debate. See id. at 8. Appropriately enough, the same sorts of criticisms have been registered
against the concept of privacy. See, e.g., RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS
(2001). Geuss argues:
It is... a mistake to answer the question, "Why shouldn't we interfere with that?" with
"Because it is private," and think that this is the obvious end of the discussion. In itself
it merely and tautologically says that we should not interfere because that is the kind of
thing we think we ought not to interfere with.
Id. at 107. Smith and Geuss are right that a normative choice underlies both the harm principle
and the concept of privacy generally. Once society or the Court renders a normative judgment
about what counts as a harm or why something ought not to be interfered with, however, legal
scholarship can make contributions to an important discourse. To the extent that Lawrence rep-
resents such a normative judgment, this Article takes that judgment as a given and explores its
ramifications.
77. I use the word "relatively" because some senses provide more certainty than others about
whether the conduct in question is occurring. Seeing people having sex provides greater cer-
tainty to the observer than hearing people having sex through a thin hotel wall.
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sex, such as rowdiness, traffic jams, or criminal behavior. Third, sexu-
ality in public might engender pure aesthetic harms.7
The first of these justifications is plainly the strongest. When a child
witnesses two (or more) people having sex, that is a problem. To the
extent that "public sex" refers to those sexual acts performed in open
access public spaces, children cannot be excluded from these spaces
without depriving the public of the benefits associated with true public
space.79 Even limiting the discussion to adults, however, seeing a sex
act imposes a discrete harm on the nonconsenting adult.80 The com-
mon law has long distinguished between visible sexual conduct, which
could be proscribed as a nuisance, and conduct that took place behind
closed doors, which could not.81 Society regards the woman walking
down the street who is flashed by a man wearing only a trench coat as
a "victim. '8 2 Society does not regard someone who merely knows
78. For further discussion of the benefits and costs of public nudity, see Jeffrey C. Narvil,
Revealing the Bare Uncertainties of Indecent Exposure, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 85, 108-14
(1995).
79. On the benefits of public space, see Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public
Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 27-28 (2004).
80. See JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 17-18 (1985). Feinberg argues:
The disquietude caused in casual observers by public nudity and sexual behavior is a
complicated psychological phenomenon .... To begin with, nude bodies and copulat-
ing couples, like all forms of nuisance, have the power of preempting the attention and
absorbing the reluctant viewer, whatever his preferences in the matter .... There is a
temptation to see and savour all, and to permit oneself to become sexually stimulated,
as by a pornographic film, but instantly the temptations of voyeurism trigger the famil-
iar mechanism of inhibition and punishment in the form of feelings of shame.... When
the precipitating experience is not mere nudity, but actual sexual activity, even of a
"normal" kind, it will create a kind of inner agitation at best, and at worst that experi-
ence of exposure to oneself of one's "peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable aspects,"
which is called shame.
Id.; see also HUMPHREYS, supra note 59, at 159 ("The 'public' nature of the offense may become
crucial because it violates a norm that western societies, at least, demand in the case of all sexual
(and many other interpersonal) acts: The principle of free consent.").
81. John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 277-79, 297 (2001). See also
PHILIP A. CURRY & STEEVE MONGRAIN, WHAT You DON'T SEE CAN'T HURT You: AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF MORALITY LAwS (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Working
Paper No. 48, 2004), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=alea (sug-
gesting that morality laws seek to proscribe behavior with which the associated negative exter-
nality is reduced if the behavior's visibility is decreased); Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality
Legislation and the Limits of State Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1999) (arguing
that Florida law barred the prosecution of an individual who fondled another person in a gay bar
because no one, other than the arresting officer, witnessed or was offended by the fondling, as
the club was not open to the general public).
82. Society's response to the man who is flashed by the woman differs. Indeed, given preva-
lent social norms, many men would regard such flashing as a benefit, not a harm. On the con-
sent-based understanding of privacy that I offer here, the female flasher would run the risk that
someone would see her flashing and be offended by it, but, ceteris paribus, this risk might be
lower than that faced by her male flasher counterpart.
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that another stranger has been flashed as a victim in the same way.
So, consistent with the harm principle, if people in a city conclude that
public displays of affection are "gross," then the people can prohibit
such displays in open access areas, even if the notions of "gross" and
"immoral" are inextricably intertwined. The Constitution might only
prevent such regulation if a community treats comparable homosexual
and heterosexual displays differently83 or if the conduct in question is
sufficiently expressive to qualify for First Amendment protection.84
The second of these justifications-secondary effects-is also
straightforward, not to mention consistent with the Supreme Court's
nude dancing cases.85 The idea here is that a municipality cannot tar-
get nude dancing as such, but it can act to prevent the harmful secon-
dary effects of nude dancing. On the whole, this is a somewhat
unsatisfying line of argumentation, since it seems plain that in the
wake of these decisions, municipalities disguise morality-based oppo-
sition to nude dancing itself as opposition to its secondary effects. In
any event, there is a legitimate empirical argument that sex in limited
commons contributes to substantial negative externalities whose ef-
fects are felt outside the limited commons. 86 That said, if secondary
effects are used to justify restrictions on large gatherings for the pur-
poses of sexual contact, the contours of legal doctrine will be decisive.
Can criminal defendants avoid liability by showing that their particu-
lar activities created no more secondary effects than permitted non-
sexual gatherings? Or need a state only show a rational basis for con-
cluding that sex-related gatherings in general contribute to more nega-
tive externalities than other unrestricted gatherings involving equal
numbers of people? Given Lawrence's Delphic pronouncements re-
garding the appropriate level of scrutiny,87 the answer to this question
remains unclear.
The third justification-aesthetics-is a broader version of the first
justification, and recourse to property law will again prove helpful.
83. Such divergent treatment might be prohibited under either the dignity rationale articu-
lated in the Lawrence majority opinion or the equal protection rationale invoked by Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. See Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 55
Sup. CT. REV. 75, 136 (2003).
84. For a discussion of conduct that qualifies as expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
85. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-42 (2002); City of
Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-301 (2000).
86. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 300; see also State ex rel. Montgomery v. Pakrats Motorcycle
Club, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (discussing anecdotal evidence of such spillover
effects).
87. See generally Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.
J. CoNsT. L. 945 (2004).
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American law in recent decades increasingly has recognized that the
state's police power extends to regulating aesthetics of its publicly visi-
ble spaces.88 This authority extends not only to public and commer-
cial buildings but also to the exteriors of single family homes as well.
89
Notably, most courts no longer require the state to justify its regula-
tion on the basis of economic considerations (e.g., an ugly building
lowers property values on the block) or some other tangible harm
(e.g., causing glare for nearby motorists, harming the health of nearby
residents, or the like). 90 Rather, promoting beautiful, harmonious, or
historic exteriors is itself enough of an interest to warrant state restric-
tions on building exteriors.91 Indeed, it appears that the government
can restrict residents of an area to building houses in particular archi-
tectural styles.92
If the state can regulate the appearance of building exteriors on the
basis of purely aesthetic judgments, it seems appropriate to let the
state regulate sexual conduct that is visible to members of the public.
To be sure, a family's claim to build a modern home in a colonial
neighborhood deserves some weight, just as an exhibitionist couple's
desire to express themselves in public deserves some weight. But
those individuals' liberty interests ought to be balanced against the
collective's weighty interests in regulating the appearance of their im-
mediate environment. This appearance helps the community define
itself and send signals to outsiders whom the community would like to
attract. Given this communitarian interest, the state might use aes-
thetic justifications to prohibit conduct in open access areas that is less
offensive than public intercourse or full frontal nudity.93 Indeed, the
state might clamp down on public kissing or conduct that is merely
suggestive of erotic themes. 94 While such efforts could well run afoul
88. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1019 (5th ed. 2002).
89. See John Nivala, Constitutional Architecture: The First Amendment and the Single Family
House, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 291, 301 (1996) (criticizing this line of authority on freedom of
architectural expression grounds).
90. James P. Karp, The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land-Use Regulation, 15 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 307, 313-14 (1990).
91. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 20, 33 (1954) ("It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy.").
92. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
93. Using Joel Feinberg's framework, we might conclude that lack of consent could be a predi-
cate for state action against only "profound offenses," but aesthetics might lend authority to the
government to regulate offenses of lower intensity. FEINBERG, supra note 80, at 50-96.
94. Surely many of us would oppose decisions by our local governments to prosecute people
for kissing in a public park or on a public bus, but this may well be an appropriate decision for
the body politic to make, and certain religious communities may see fit to ban all displays of
affection from the town square. Indeed, governments in Indonesia and Moscow have recently
considered such measures. See Stephen Goode, Interior Decorating for Divorces; Subway Sex
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of First Amendment protections for speech and conduct, they do seem
to satisfy Lawrence's harm principle.
Notice what is happening. The Lawrence Court's simultaneous em-
brace of both the harm principle and the public-private dichotomy so-
lidifies a distinction between regulation on the basis of morality
(prohibited) and regulation on the basis of aesthetics (permitted).
Aesthetics, of course, has a substantial moral component, and is
equally subjective. The only real difference is that aesthetics deals
with behaviors that third parties can perceive with their own senses,
and morality also encompasses behaviors that third parties may be-
lieve to be occurring but cannot perceive. Although the line that the
Court is drawing here has its flaws and conceptual difficulties, it is a
defensible rule of thumb.
V. THE CASE FOR PUBLIC SEX
What interests does public sex further and why might we be con-
cerned about treating it more harshly than private sex? There is ex-
tensive literature on public sex.95 Notably, the defenders of public sex
generally refer to sex in limited commons areas, as opposed to open
access areas. Some authors argue that confining sex to residential
bedrooms renders sex itself shameful, prevents sexual awareness and
growth, and actually harms children more than it helps them. 96
Others note that sexual abuse typically occurs in the most private
spaces, and so a society interested in protecting children and privileg-
ing consent ought not to focus on public spaces.97
Police, INSIGHT, Jan. 5, 2004, at 8, 2004 WL 55098512; Indonesia May Kiss Public Affection
Goodbye, AUSTRALIAN BROAD. CORP. NEWS, Mar. 8, 2004, 2004 WL 70188656; cf. Chris
Sheedy, Love Is in the Chair, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 5, 2004, 2004 WL 74954449(reporting that thirty-nine percent of human resources managers surveyed at U.S. firms sup-
ported rules prohibiting public displays of affection in the workplace).
95. See, e.g., GILBERT D. BARTELL, GROUP SEX: A SCIENTIST'S EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE
AMERICAN WAY OF SWINGING (1971); CALIFIA, supra note 58; HUMPHREYS, supra note 59;
Leap, supra note 58.
96. See CALIFIA, supra note 58, at 78-81; Kendall Thomas, Going Public: A Conversation with
Lidell Jackson and Jocelyn Taylor, in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLITICS AND THE FUTURE
OF AIDS ACTIVISM 53, 56-57 (Ephen Glenn Colter et al. eds., 1996). Robert Post recently
observed that if one takes seriously Lawrence's dignity-based notion of privacy, the case for
restricting public conduct by homosexuals disappears. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 103-04 (2003).
97. HUMPHREYS, supra note 59, at 162.
In the absence of social visibility and vice squad activity, strong cultural norms protect
the sanctity of consent to copresence in bedrooms and parlors. Here, however, most
rapes and acts of incest are committed, most child molestation is found, most seduction
of teenagers occurs. This continuum suggests a final hypothesis: As both social visibil-
ity and sanctions decrease, due to apparent protection of the right of consent to
copresence, the danger to society of sexual activity in these settings increases. It is the
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Even among the most radical proponents of public sex, it is difficult
to find people who favor sex in open access locations.98 Although
some exhibitionists derive sexual gratification from having their sex
acts watched by an audience, this is usually couched in terms of an
audience of willing observers, not passersby or, worse yet, a hostile
audience. 99 Indeed, qualms about open access sex are reflected in be-
haviors as well. In general, people who want to have sex in open ac-
cess spaces try to limit the number of non-consenting passersby who
might witness the act-choosing relatively isolated or less visible loca-
tions.10 0 They thus try to find open access spaces that nevertheless
offer a strong probability of social privacy.10' To the extent that indi-
viduals deviate from these norms, they may have a preference for en-
gaging in proscribed sex acts because of their illegality. The law, quite
rightly, ignores such preferences for illegality.
The same trends hold true when one shifts from spatial privacy to
social privacy. There are Americans whose participation in poly-
amorous relationships seems central to their identity.10 2 But even
among them, sex acts tend to involve dyads. Gilbert Bartell's socio-
logical study of swinging suburban couples suggests that dyads are
more common and more preferred than other arrangements. 0 3 When
couples switch spouses, they thus tend to go into separate bedrooms
during the sex acts.10 4 In short, sex remains primarily a small-numbers
activity, even among those who openly reject monogamy. 0 5
safeguarded, walled-in, socially invisible variety of sex we have to fear, not that which
takes place in public.
Id.
98. For example, Scott O'Hara's radical defense of sex in public parks is predicated on the fact
that his conduct occurs in the bushes, not the thoroughfares. Scott O'Hara, Talking with My
Mouth Full, in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS ACTIVISM,
supra note 96, at 81, 84 ("[H]e and I both get pleasure from the act; the rest of the world, without
extreme measures of surveillance, would never even know about it. I don't know how anyone
can claim that we're harming society.").
99. See Stephen 0. Murray, Self Size and Observable Sex, in PUBLIC SEX: GAY SPACE, supra
note 58, at 157.
100. See id.; HUMPHREYS, supra note 59, at 7, 161; Michael C. Clatts, Ethnographic Observa-
tions of Men Who Have Sex with Men in Public: Toward an Ecology of Sexual Action, in PUBLIC
SEX: GAY SPACE, supra note 58, at 141, 145-46.
101. SCHNEIDER, supra note 41, at 57-58. Admittedly, these practices might reflect concerns
about criminal prosecution for public indecency.
102. Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Exis-
tence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 310-16 (2004).
103. BARTELL, supra note 95, at 142-43.
104. Id.
105. Some forms of group sex evidently appeal to a rather large segment of the U.S. popula-
tion, particularly men. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEX-
UALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 159, 162-65 tbl. 4.3 (1994). For example,
nearly half of all men aged eighteen to forty-four found group sex "very appealing" or "some-
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A survey of the literature on "public sex" therefore reveals that the
type of sex that could satisfy the harm principle is not particularly
prevalent, let alone vociferously advocated. 0 6 When people engage
in sex in public parks or restrooms, they generally try to seclude them-
selves from the view of passersby. Semi-public sex does take place in
bath houses, bars, sex clubs, and private residences, but there are
rarely involuntary witnesses, and access to these locations is tightly
controlled. The state undoubtedly retains the right to prohibit sex in
open access spaces or limited commons spaces that have failed to
warn unwitting passersby.10 7 But these forms of conduct are rare, and
even when they do occur, the participants ordinarily will take enough
precautions to prevent the naive passerby from noticing.10 8
To be sure, sex in open access spaces may have some marginal ex-
pressive benefits, and may offer genuine utility to a small group of
people for whom exposing one's self to unwitting strangers is sexually
gratifying.10 9 But open access sex does not present a hard case under
either the First Amendment or a welfare maximization theory. The
potential for shame, improper exposure to minors, violence, and dis-
order are too substantial.
Given the previous discussion, we can now answer Justice Scalia's
question of, when does sex become public enough to allow the state to
restrict it under the harm principal?11 o One person engaged in soli-
tary sexual conduct at home has long been given substantial constitu-
tional protection.11' Lawrence unambiguously extends the scope of
constitutional protection to two people within a home, even if procre-
ation decisions are not implicated, and even if a nosy neighbor might
have a strong reason to believe that sodomy is occurring outside of
public view.112 In so doing, Lawrence implicitly accepts the informa-
tion privacy idea that information or conduct can remain private even
what appealing." By contrast, only four to six percent of men aged eighteen to forty-four de-
scribed same-gender sex as very appealing or somewhat appealing. Id. Unfortunately, the
Laumann data does not break down group sex into sub-categories (i.e., sex involving three peo-
ple, four people, more than four people).
106. See generally sources cited supra notes 95-104.
107. See, e.g., State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684 (Haw. 1970) (upholding indecent exposure convic-
tions for nude sunbathers because their "nude beach" was a popular location for fisherman and
members of the general public).
108. See, e.g., Recreational Developments of Phoenix, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 83 F. Supp. 2d
1072, 1078-80 (D. Ariz. 1999) (describing access restrictions at a series of sex clubs in Phoenix).
109. See Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as
a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1474 n.130 (1994).
110. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
111. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
112. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
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though it is shared with another person, so long as consent exists.
What about the threesome? Setting aside the traditionalist concerns
that the Lawrence Court deems illegitimate, there does not seem to be
a good reason to treat threesomes any differently from twosomes."
3
Indeed, as I have suggested, the important leap in privacy law is not
from "two to three," but from "one to two. '1 t4 In short, any sexual
conduct that takes place on private property, with the consent of all
witnesses and participants, seems "private" under Lawrence's harm
principal. Because the number of participants and witnesses rarely
will generate the level of secondary effects that form a predicate for
state action, consensual conduct within homes is almost always
protected.
What about the limited commons? Here again, consent is the
touchstone of privacy. The actions of a solitary sex performer at a sex
club are private if all people within the limited commons consent to
witnessing such an act. Exceptions arise only if the boundaries of the
limited commons are inadequately policed (in which case the law
should treat it like an open access space) or if the audience generates
sufficiently substantial negative externalities to fall within the Su-
preme Court's "secondary effects" line of reasoning.115 Under this
case law, the state may legislate, but only to target the secondary ef-
fects, not to target the performance itself.116 The same is true for two
or more performers within the limited commons. Indeed, within the
limited commons, the number of witnesses typically dwarfs the num-
113. One might argue, alternatively, that monogamy is welfare maximizing, and that group
sex should be restricted on paternalist grounds. For a critique of compelled monogamy, see
Emens, supra note 102.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
115. In Recreational Developments of Phoenix v. City of Phoenix, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D.
Ariz. 1999), the court took a different approach. It decided that a group of sex clubs in Phoenix
were not private, even though club employees policed the entrances of said clubs to keep out
people not interested in witnessing sex acts. Id. at 1082-84. The court found the clubs non-
private on the basis of their non-selective admissions criteria. Id. This focus on associational
privacy interests seems misguided in light of the Lawrence Court's subsequent failure to discuss
the specifics of Lawrence and Garner's relationship, and in light of the possibility that lasting
intimate associations might develop among strangers who meet at sex clubs. Cf. Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate contact with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring."). After Lawrence it
would seem that sexual privacy hinges on spatial privacy considerations more than associational
privacy considerations. From an information privacy perspective, the fact that most participants
in the club were strangers, as opposed to old friends, seems orthogonal to the issue of whether
the conduct was "private," and certainly bore little or no relationship to the harm principle.
After all, obscure sex acts performed for strangers seem less likely to have lasting repercussions
than sex acts performed for friends, relatives, or neighbors.
116. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 293-301 (2000).
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ber of participants, so the number of participants may be a negligible
consideration.
In open access environments, things change dramatically. In such
environments there is a real likelihood that a naive passerby will be
exposed to the act in question. The harm principle is invariably satis-
fied because unwanted exposure to someone else's sex act is a harm
and also because efforts to exclude passersby from open access areas
also represents a harm (an improper assertion of dominion, in this
case). After Lawrence, these spaces are the zones in which the state
retains untrammeled authority to regulate sex acts.
The following figure introduces the different categories of relatively
public and private sex. On private property, whose borders are nor-
mally protected, the increasing number of participants in the room
renders the conduct in question decreasingly private. But these differ-
ences are ordinarily incremental and, barring huge gatherings in man-
sions, will not generate the kinds of secondary effects that might
justify state regulation under the harm principle. 117 In the limited
commons, there may be a large enough potential audience to dwarf
the effects of the increase in the number of participants. Thus, ceteris
paribus, a sex performance with one performer and one hundred audi-
ence members is as private as one with three performers and ninety-
eight audience members. One's status as a participant or audience
member does not seem to matter, so long as consent is established.
As the number of participants and audience members increases, how-
ever, the magnitude of any secondary effects increases, and so does
the predicate for state involvement. Finally, in open access spaces,
there is generally a very substantial risk of non-consensual exposure
to embarrassing images or of improper efforts to exclude someone
from a space that is legally open to all. In such spheres, the state's
authority to regulate is virtually untrammeled.
117. Sex clubs are another matter. See Recreational Developments of Phoenix, 83 F. Supp. 2d
at 1079 (noting that at some sex clubs, "several hundred people" could show up on a given
night).
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FIGURE 1: RELATIVE PRIVACY IN VARIOUS SPACES
Private Property Limited Commons Open Access
1 participant Most Private Relatively Private Relatively Public
Stanley 118 with border control
2 participants Relatively Private Relatively Private Relatively Public
Lawrence 119  with border control
3 or more Relatively Private Relatively Private Least Private
participants Lovisi 120  with border control
This figure and analysis suggest that once one accepts the idea of so-
cial privacy, spatial privacy quickly trumps social privacy as a decisive
consideration. Social privacy might make an important difference of
degree in situations where there is no audience (i.e., on private prop-
erty), but once a sizable audience exists, it hardly matters how many
people fill the various roles of audience member and participant.
VI. THINKING ABOUT THE CASE LAw-Lovsi v. SLAYTON
Let us now return to our paradigmatic case-the Fourth Circuit's
1976 opinion in Lovisi v. Slayton.121 At the outset, I applauded the
court's effort to bring information privacy principles into decisional
privacy case law. 122 That being said, Lovisi's vision of information pri-
vacy is highly distorted. In the court's view, Mr. Dunn's participation
in the sex act deprived the Lovisis of whatever social privacy they oth-
erwise would have had.123 But, as we have seen, information privacy
law ordinarily is just as receptive to the idea of privacy among three as
it is to the notion of privacy between two.124 Spatial privacy also
counsels against the result in Lovisi because the conduct in question
took place in a private residence. 125 The idea that the Lovisis had no
reasonable expectation of privacy once they invited Earl Dunn into
their bedroom is silly. If that was all that happened in the case, it
would have been wrongly decided, particularly after Lawrence.
12 6
118. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
119. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
120. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 8-20.
122. See supra text accompanying note 24.
123. See supra text accompanying note 20.
124. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying note 18.
126. In this respect, my understanding of Lawrence diverges from that of Katherine Franke,
who concludes that the Supreme Court would probably not strike down a consensual sodomy
law applied to group sex in a private residence. Franke, supra note 52, at 1410-11.
The lesson of the [European Court of Human Rights'] recent sexual privacy jurispru-
dence is that rather raunchy forms of sex can be insulated from government regulation
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671
In this case, however, there was further dissemination, via the
Lovisis' daughter. Although the court did not devote any attention to
this dissemination, it is that subsequent distribution that potentially
implicated the harm principle. The Lovisi children found photographs
depicting their parents engaged in sexually explicit acts.127 This is a
harm because the child cannot consent effectively to witnessing these
acts and allowing the parent to consent on the child's behalf is prob-
lematic on these facts. One of the Lovisis' daughters then brought a
sexually explicit photograph from home to school and showed it to
other children.128 Here we have another harm. Eventually, a teacher
found the photograph and contacted the authorities. 129 By creating
the photographs and taking insufficient precautions to prevent their
dissemination, the Lovisis exposed multiple minors to sexually explicit
images. 130 It is as though the photographed activities took place in a
highly visible open access site. The harm principle is satisfied, and the
state should be free to punish the conduct in question. Only if the
Lovisis had taken sufficient steps to render the photographs' dissemi-
nation highly unlikely or unforeseeable would the couple be able to
escape liability.131
if they take place within a marriage or, absent a marriage or other sanctioned relation-
ship, if they in no way threaten to seep into public view. If cases like these were to
come before the United States Supreme Court now ... a case [involving multiple par-
ticipants in a sex act] would likely come out differently. The sex at issue [in such a case]
was not an expression of an enduring bond, and it did not take place in the context of a
relationship. Indeed, there was nothing about it that evokes the warm, fuzzy, domesti-
cated backdrop of Lawrence. It was just sex. Lawrence, most likely, would provide
those men little comfort.
Id. As long as the private owner took ordinary precautions to shield the activity from non-
consenting outsiders, there is simply no harm, and thus no predicate for state action. I believe
that Lawrence makes this abundantly clear, and that the Court's failure to take interest in the
details of Lawrence and Garner's relationship is telling. Lawrence's distinction between public
and private acts is an application of the harm principle, but Lawrence's privileging of dyads over
triads would be an abrogation of it.
127. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 623 (E.D. Va. 1973).
128. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 351.
130. The Lovisi children do not appear to have brought any photographs of the Lovisis and
Dunn into school, but it appears that the children had access to those photographs. Lovisi, 363
F. Supp. at 623.
131. Jurisdictions' bans on public sex acts typically require not only that a non-consenting
person see the act in question, but also that such exposure would have been foreseeable to the
participants. See Michael E. Malamut, Proposal for Revision of Archaic Statutes Implicating
Private Consensual Noncommercial Adult Sexual Conduct, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 45, 83-84
(1993).
Let me add one complication. Assume that the Lovisis actually took insufficient steps to pre-
vent the photographs' dissemination. Say they carelessly left the photographs lying around on
the kitchen table for a week, but their daughter never found them. Can the state punish their
conduct? In order to answer this question, one needs to decide whether satisfying the harm
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VII. CONCLUSION
Lawrence gives us a world where everyone who is exposed or po-
tentially exposed to a sex act is capable of consenting, and does in fact
consent to participating in or witnessing the act. If everyone consents,
then, under an information privacy understanding of Lawrence, the
act is "private" and its participants are protected under the Constitu-
tion. 32 When the Lawrence Court refers to Lawrence and Garner's
conduct as being "private and consensual," 13
3 the Court was being re-
dundant. Garner's consent to have sex with Lawrence, in the pres-
ence of no one else, rendered their activity private. This explains why
the Court sensibly drew a distinction between sex in public places and
sex in private places. In a relatively public place, participants have no
right to exclude outsiders, and therefore encounter the risk that an
outsider, who does not consent to seeing the act, will in fact be sub-
jected to it.
More provocatively, Lawrence appears to suggest that the police
power authorizes the state to regulate rather minor, aesthetic offenses
relating to human sexuality, so long as those offenses occur in open
access sites or inadequately controlled limited commons. We might
read Lawrence as part of a trend in property law generally that autho-
principle requires an actual harm or whether a risk of a harm is sufficient. As a general matter,
Millian philosophers have concluded that a risk of a harm is a harm for the purposes of the harm
principle. Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 969, 984
n.108 (2000). Thus, the state could punish the Lovisis even if they were lucky enough to avoid
the further dissemination of the photographs. Cf. Malamut, supra note 131, at 84 n.193.
Malamut quotes Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 422 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1981), for the proposition
that "conduct is not established as public merely because another person actually observes 
the
conduct, and, conversely, in order to be illegal, the conduct does not have to be actually ob-
served by members of the public." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Of course, it can be difficult for the state to learn about such risks in the absence of an actual
harm. One historical instance of criminal punishment for consensual acts that could not be seen
by the public was the Walter Jenkins affair. Jenkins was Lyndon Johnson's Chief of Staff and
was caught engaging in consensual sodomy with another man in the stall of a basement restroom
of a Y.M.C.A. Lee Edelman, Tearooms and Sympathy, or, The Epistemology of the Water Closet,
in NATIONALISMS & SEXUALITIES 263,263-66 (Andrew Parker et al. eds., 1992). The closed stall
door would have prevented a restroom user from seeing their act, but the Washington D.C. vice
police were able to look down into the stalls from an elevated peephole. Id. at 266. For a more
recent case involving somewhat similar police tactics, see People v. Lynch, 445 N.W.2d 803
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by People v. Brashier, 496 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992),
whose abrogation in turn was recognized by People v. Bono, 641 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002).
132. To clarify, according to my analysis of privacy, a rape that occurs in the bedroom of a
single family home is not "private." It is not private because of the victim's lack of consent to
the assailant's acts; she does not consent to make her body parts visible and accessible 
to the
assailant, nor does she consent to being exposed to his body. This is not the most important
reason why rape is wrong, but it is the most important reason why rape can never be private.
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
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rizes majoritarian regulation of individual public conduct that is insuf-ficiently harmful to constitute a common law "nuisance" but
sufficiently offensive to galvanize citizens to seek restrictive legisla-
tion. This suggests that Lawrence's embrace of both the harm princi-
ple and a sharp public-private distinction will raise the stakes of First
Amendment law in the coming years, and perhaps draw renewed at-
tention from those combatants in the cultural wars who were disap-
pointed by the result of Lawrence.
